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TAX LAW 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUGGESTS ALTERNATIVE 
STANDARD FOR DEFICIENCY NOTICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Meridian Wood Products, Inc. u. United States and 
Lenton u. United States/ the Ninth Circuit ruled the limita-
tions period on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) assessment 
of a tax deficiency ran from the date specified in the extension 
agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS, not from the date 
the deficiency notice was mailed to the taxpayer. Therefore, an 
assessment of deficiency mailed after the expiration of the ex-
tension agreement but prior to the date specified in the agree-
ment was timely. 
The court also held that the taxpayer must substantiate 
business expense deductions by a preponderance of the evi-
dence,2 and that appellate review of the trial court's determina-
tion of whether or not the taxpayer has met the burden of proof 
is subject to the clearly erroneous standard.3 
1. 725 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation). These two cases were consoli· 
dated on appeal. 
Id. 
2. I.R.C. §274(d) (1982) provides in part: 
No deduction shall be allowed-
(1) under section 162 or 212 for any traveling expense (includ-
ing meals and lodging while away from home), 
(2) for any item with respect to any activity which is of a type 
generally considered to constitute entertainment ... unless 
the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient 
evidence corroborating his own statement. (A) the amount of 
such expense or other item, (B) the time and place of the 
travel, entertainment ... , (C) the business purpose of the ex-
pense or other item, and (D) the business relationship to the 
taxpayer of persons entertained .... 
3. 725 F.2d at 1190. 
263 
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit initially focused on the timeliness of the· 
IRS deficiency assessments against the taxpayers and began it's 
analysis by looking at the language of the extension agreement.4 
The agreement contemplated that a notice of deficiency, if sent 
prior to October 15, 1979, would extend the limitations period 
for 150 days. Plaintiffs asserted the extension agreement was 
ambiguous because the clause, "the time for assessing the tax 
shall be further extended" did not clearly refer to the October 
15, date:
' 
4. Plaintiffs Harry and Colleen Lenton and Meridian Wood Products, Inc., entered 
into an agreement with the IRS, pursuant to §6501 of the Internal Revenue Code (the 
"Code"). The agreement stated in part: 
1d. at 1185. 
The amount(s) of any Federal Income Tax due under any re-
turn(s) made by or on behalf of the above named taxpayer(s) 
for the period(s) ended October 31, 1974 and October 31, 1975 
. . . under existing or prior revenue laws, may be assessed at 
any time on or before October 15, 1979, except that if a notice 
of deficiency in tax for any such period(s) is sent to the tax-
payer(s) on or before that day, then the time for assessing the 
tax shall be further extended for the period in which the as-
sessment is prohibited and for 60 days thereafter. 
I.R.C. §6501(c)(4) (1982) provides in part: 
1d. 
Where, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this 
section for the assessment of any tax imposed by this title ... 
both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in writing 
to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at 
any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. 
The agreement extended the time in which the IRS could assess any federal income 
tax due under returns filed by the plaintiffs for the periods ended October 31, 1974 and 
October 31, 1975. The agreement had an expiration date of October 15, 1979, however if 
the IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer prior to the expiration date, the 
IRS was given an additional 150 days to assess any tax deficiency. A notice of deficiency 
restricts the ability of the IRS to assess and collect an asserted tax deficiency. I.R.C. 
§6213 (a) (1982) provides in part: 
1d. 
Within 90 days ... after the notice of deficiency authorized in 
section 6212 is mailed . . . the taxpayer may file a petition 
with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. 
Except as otherwise provided . . . no assessment of a defi-
ciency in respect of any tax imposed ... shall be made ... 
until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until 
the expiration of such 90-day ... period ... , nor, if a peti-
tion has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of 
the Tax Court has become final. 
5. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1982). 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's contention that the 
150 day extension period commenced on May 29, 1979, the date 
the notice of deficiency was sent.I In rejecting this argument the 
court relied on Ramirez v. United States, where a similar argu-
ment was rejected as unreasonable.7 The court pointed out that 
the extension agreement between the IRS and the Lenton's, like 
the one in Ramirez, only set forth one expiration date. The plain 
meaning of the agreement was the sending of a notice of defi-
ciency would extend the limitations period beyond the October 
15, date.8 Since the plaintiffs did not file a petition with the Tax 
Court, the total limitations period was 150 days commencing on 
October 15, 1979. Therefore, the November 4 and 5 assessments 
were timely.9 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected plaintiff's argument because 
even if the limitations period commenced on May 29, 1979, the 
November 4 and 5 assessments were timely by virtue of sections 
6501 and 6503.10 The court considered the agreement between 
the IRS and the taxpayers within the meaning of §6501 and 
6. 725 F.2d at 1186. 
7. 538 F.2d 888 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976). In Ramirez the extim-
sion agreement had a June 30, 1972 expiration"date but if a notice of deficiency was sent 
prior to that date, then the time for making an aaaessment was extended beyond that 
date for 150 days. Id. at 891. The taxpayer asserted that the phrase "that date" referred 
to the date on which the deficiency notice was sent not the expiration date. The court 
dismiaaed the assertion noting the agreement set forth only one date which referred to an 
aaaeaament, June 30, 1972. The court said "[it is unreasonable) to assert that the phrase 
'that date' ... referred to two separate dates, without any hint that it did in the lan-
guage itself." 1 d. 
8. 725 F.2d at 1187. The IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to the plaintiffs on May 
29, 1979. The plaintiffs did not file a petition with the Tax Court to have the deficiency 
redetermined. Thereafter on November 4 and 5, 1979, the IRS assessed a tax deficiency 
against the plaintiffs. Id. 
9. Id. at 1186. 
10. Section 6501 provides for a three year statute of limitations after a return is filed 
in which any tax may by assessed. I.R.C. §6501 (a) (1982). An exception to the three year 
statute of limitations is for written agreements that extend the time in which an aaaeaa-
ment can be made. I.R.C. §6501 (c)(4) (1982). Section 6503 provides: "[T)he running of 
the period of limitations provided in section 6501 ... on the making of assessments ... 
in respect of any deficiency. . . shall . . . be suspended for the period during which the 
Secretary is prohibited from making the assessment ... and for 60 days thereafter." 
I.R.C. §6503(a)(l) (1982). 
The period which the Secretary is prohibited from making an assessment is deter-
mined by §6213(a). If a notice of deficiency is mailed to a taxpayer in the United States 
then the Secretary is prohibited from assessing any deficiency until 90 days after the 
notice is sent. I.R.C. §6213(a) (1982), supra note 4. The combined effect of these two 
statutes is to prohibit any assessment until 150 days after the deficiency notice is mailed. 
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therefore subject to the suspension provision of §6503.11 
The court next addressed the deductions for travel and en-
tertainment expenses taken by Meridian. A taxpayer must sub-
stantiate every element of every expenditure by records or 
through their own statements corroborated by other evidence in 
order to deduct entertainment and travel expenses under section 
274 and section 162.12 
Plaintiffs argued that although their records did not show 
the business purpose or the business relationship of the payee to 
the taxpayer, they had substantially complied with the require-
ments of § 274 because their records established the date, the 
amount, and the payee for the various expenditures.13 Plaintiffs 
also argued that since the IRS did not rebut this evidence the 
judgment of the district court should be reversed. 14 
Initially, the panel noted plaintiffs' reliance on Caratan v. 
Commissioner/IS was inappropriate because plaintiffs failed to 
introduce evidence contrary to the findings of the IRS and failed 
to meet their burden of showing the merits of their claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.16 
11. 725 F.2d at 1188. 
12. Dowell v. United States, 522 F.2d 708, 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
920 (1976). The elements of the expenditures which must be substantiated are: amount; 
time and place; business purpose, and; business relationship to the taxpayer of the per-
son entertained. I.R.C. §274(d) (1982). I.R.C. §162(a) (1982) provides in part: "There 
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred 
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... " [d. 
13. The IRS audited Meridian's returns for the years 1974 and 1975. The audit dis-
closed that Meridian's records of expenditures, which had been deducted as business 
expenses, failed to indicate the business purpose of the expenditure, the persons enter-
tained and the date of each expense as required by §274 of the Code. Vouchers submit-
ted by Harry Lenton for reimbursement of these expenses, also failed to comply with the 
substantiation requirements of §274. Consequently, for purposes of the IRS audit, 
Lenton prepared an addendum to the vouchers attempting to explicitly describe the bus-
iness purposes of the expenditures. The IRS disallowed these deductions and Meridian 
appealed to the district court. The district court ruled that Meridian had failed to intro-
duce sufficient evidence of the business purpose for the expenditures and thus failed to 
substantiate the expenses as required under )274.) 725 F.2d at 1190. 
14. 725 F.2d at 1189. 
15. 442 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1975). In Caratan the Ninth Circuit stated that a pre-
sumption of correctness existed in favor of an IRS determination regarding the disallow-
ance of a deduction. [d. at 608. However, where there was testimony or other evidence 
sufficient to support a contrary finding, "the presumption of correctness disappeared." 
[d. 
16. 725 F.2d at 1189-90 (citing Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 
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In reviewing the evidence offered by Meridian to support 
his claim for deductions, the Ninth Circuit noted the claims 
were unsupported by receipts or other documentation and that 
aggregate amounts of expenditures were deducted rather than 
individual expenditures. Since the trial court's findings were not 
clearly erroneous, the Ninth Circuit deemed them to be 
correct. 17 
The other issue addressed by the panel was the lower 
court's conclusion that the deductions previously disallowed by 
the IRS constituted a constructive dividend to the taxpayer. The 
test for a constructive dividend is two fold: the expenses must be 
non-deductible to the corporation and they must represent some 
economic gain or benefit to the taxpayer. IS 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that the reimburse-
ments were constructive dividends to Colleen Lenton because of 
the economic benefit of reimbursement for travel expenses. 
Since Harry Lenton failed to prove the reimbursements were 
business expenses,19 the disallowed deductions were also consid-
ered to be constructive dividends.20 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Meridian Wood Products, the Ninth Circuit has sug-
1971». In Rockwell the court held the taxpayer was required to rebut the initial pre-
sumption in favor of the IRS and then still had the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 
885. Meridian asserted that vouchers prepared by Harry Lenton for Meridian to reim-
burse him were sufficient to satisfy the third element under §274, business purpose of 
the expenditure. The district court rejected this assertion because the vouchers and ad-
dendum failed to show the origins of the expense and specifically explain the individual 
expenses. The Ninth Circuit held the district court's determination whether the taxpayer 
had presented persuasive proof to satisfy the substantiation requirements of §274 was a 
factual one, reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. 725 F.2d at 1190 (citing 
Paal v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1971». In Paal the appellant-taxpayer did 
not introduce any objective evidence or third party testimony establishing the elements 
of §274 and thus did not persuade the trial court of its claim for deductions for en-
tertainment expenses. The Paal court considered the trial court's findings to be factual 
and could not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 1110. 
17. 725 F.2d at 1190. 
18. Id. at 1191 (citing, Palo Alto Town & Country Village Inc. v. Commissioner, 565 
F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1977). In Palo Alto the Ninth Circuit overturned a Tax Court 
determination that a corporation's disallowed expenses automatically become construc-
tive dividends to an owner of the corporation. Id. 
19. See supra note 13. 
20. 725 F.2d at 1191. 
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gested utilization of section 6503 as an alternative basis for de-
termining the timeliness of deficiency assessments. Section 6503 
suspends the general statute of limitations for 60 days beyond 
the period in which the Secretary is prohibited from assessing a 
deficiency (90 days). Thus, even if the limitations period were to 
commence on the date the deficiency notice was mailed, the pro-
vision would suspend the assessment limitations period for 150 
days. By suggesting this alternative method the court has elimi-
nated any possible doubt as to the commencement of the statute 
of limitations for the assessment of a tax deficiency. 
Blaise Curet· 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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